

Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----151236Z 047322 /10
O 151040Z FEB 77 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4073

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 0701

NODIS

DEPT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY, LONDON, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, PRE
TORIA,
USUN, CAPETOWN

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, US, RH, WA, SF
SUBJECT: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS

REF: A) LONDON 1792 RPTD STATE 23144, B) MAPUTO 118 RPTD STATE
27871

1. SUMMARY: WE BELIEVE, LIKE EMBASSY MAPUTO, THAT THE
GUERRILLAS CANNOT BE EXCLUDED FROM A SETTLEMENT IN RHODESIA
AND THAT THE US SHOULD AVOID TAKING SIDES AMONG ZIMBABWEAN
NATIONALISTS WHILE ALLOWING THE DYNAMICS OF THE SITUATION TO WORK
THEMSELVES OUT FURTHER. ON NAMIBIA, HOWEVER, IT SEEMS TO US
THE TIME FOR AT LEAST CAUTIOUS ACTION, POSSIBLY THROUGH THE NEW
UN COMMISSIONER FOR NAMIBIA, HAS COME. LOOMING OVER BOTH
THESE PROBLEMS IS THAT OF SOUTH AFRICA, AND WE FEEL THE US
SHOULD BEGIN TO DEAL WITH SOUTH AFRICA QUA SOUTH AFRICA RATHER
THAN WITH IT MAINLY AS AN INSTRUMENT IN OUR APPROACH TO RHODESIA
AND NAMIBIA. END SUMMARY.

2. RHODESIA: VERY THOROUGH AND THOUGHTFUL REFEELS FROM EMBASSY
LONDON AND MAPUTO LEAVE US WITH RELATIVELY LITTLE TO ADD ON
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RHODESIA. WE AGREE WITH MAPUTO THAT ANY SETTLEMENT WHICH
ATTEMPTS TO EXCLUDE MILITARY LEADERS IS LIKELY TO BE A VERY
DANGEROUS ONE. THEY WILL NOT DWINDLE AWAY OF THEMSELVES. THE
COMMUNIST POWERS WILL GO TO CONSIDERABLE ENDS TO SUPPORT THEM.
THEY HAVE A KEY ROLE IN THE THINKING OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS.
AS LONDON SAYS, POLITICAL FORCES ARE MORE IMPORTANT (AND MORE
PERMANENT) THAN NEGOTIATING FORMULAE. AND "THE BOYS", AS NYERERE

CALLS THEM, HAVE BECOME A FUNDAMENTAL POLITICAL (AS WELL AS MILITARY) FORCE.

3. FOR THE US TO TAKE SIDES AMONG THE NATIONALIST GROUPS IS ALSO TO IGNORE POLITICAL REALITIES. WE WOULD NOT ONLY LOSE MUCH OF WHATEVER TRUST WE HAVE BUILT UP AMONG AFRICANS. WE SIMPLY LACK THE MEANS TO PROMOTE EFFECTIVELY ANY CHOICE WE MIGHT MAKE AMONG THE CONTENDERS. (ANGOLA DEMONSTRATED THAT.) FURTHER, WE HERE FAIL TO SEE ANY CLEARCUT MAJORITY AMONG BLACK RHODESIANS, MODERATES OR OTHERWISE. THE SITUATION WILL HAVE TO SHAKE ITSELF DOWN. IF ANYONE CAN HELP IT TO DO SO, IT IS OTHER AFRICANS, NOT US.

4. IN DAR ES SALAAM WE MAY BE UNDULY INFLUENCED BY CONSTANT REPETITION OF NYERERE'S TWIN THEMES: "NO DEAL CAN BE MADE WITH SMITH" AND "DON'T RELY ON VORSTER". HOWEVER, THE LOGIC BEHIND THESE THESES (WHICH HAS BEEN OFTEN REPORTED) IS NOT UNIMPRESSIVE, NOR SHOULD THE DEPTH OF NYERERE'S BELIEF IN THEM (AND HIS POSITION AS CHAIRMAN OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS) BE UNDERESTIMATED. WE MOST EMPHATICALLY DO NOT RPT NOT BELIEVE THAT WE SHOULD ACT DIRECTLY TO REMOVE SMITH -- OR ANYONE ELSE -- FROM OFFICE. WE DO THINK THE US SHOULD KEEP CONSTANT PRESSURE ON SMITH THROUGH SUCH MOVES AS REPEAL OF THE BYRD AMENDMENT.

5. IT IS A NOT UNREASONABLE ESTIMATE THAT THE DYNAMICS OF THE SITUATION, I.E., INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE, TOGETHER WITH THAT OF THE GUERRILLAS, WILL LEAD SMITH TO STEP DOWN. (WE THOUGHT HE WAS GOING TO LAST OCTOBER. WE MAY HAVE BEEN WRONG ONLY ON TIMING.) WE CONCUR WITH EMBASSY MAPUTO THAT THE BEST THING TO DO DURING
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THIS UNPLEASANT PROCESS IS SIMPLY TO KEEP OUR NERVE WHILE WAITING FOR THE FIRST POSSIBLE MOMENT TO STEP IN TO ENCOURAGE NEGOTIATION OF THE FINAL HANDOVER. WE AGREE ALSO THAT US NATIONAL INTERESTS WILL NOT NECESSARILY BE DAMAGED UNACCEPTABLY IF RADICAL LEADERS END UP RUNNING THE COUNTRY.

6. NAMIBIA: HERE AGAIN, WE MAY BE SOMEWHAT PAROCHIAL SINCE NYERERE IS URGING US TO CONCENTRATE ON NAMIBIA, LEAVING TIME, THE GUERRILLAS, AND THE BRITISH TO CARRY OUT THE RIPENING PROCESS ON RHODESIA. NEVERTHELESS, THERE DOES SEEM TO BE MORE SCOPE FOR DIRECT US ACTION ON THIS PROBLEM. ON THE BASIS OF SECRETARY KISSINGER'S CONVERSATIONS AND CORRESPONDENCE WITH NYERERE AND OF AMBASSADOR YOUNG'S CONVERSATION WITH HIM HERE FEBRUARY 6, WE AND NYERERE SEEM TO BE PRETTY MUCH IN AGREEMENT ON THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF A NAMIBIAN SOLUTION -- ASSUMING THE US STILL HAS IN ITS POCKET WHAT VORSTER OFFERED KISSINGER. NUJOMA'S MEETING WITH AMBASSADOR YOUNG FEBRUARY 6 SUGGESTS THAT HE MAY BE IN AS GOOD A NEGOTIATING MOOD AS HE HAS BEEN FOR SOME TIME. CERTAINLY, HIS INTEREST AND RECEPTIVITY TO THE US

UNDER A NEW ADMINISTRATION IS GREATER THAN IT HAS BEEN IN THE PAST.

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ABOVE ADDRESSEES.

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ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W
-----151240Z 047365 /11

O 151040Z FEB 77 ZFF-4
FM AMAMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4074

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 DAR ES SALAAM 0701

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DEPT PLEASE PASS SECRETARY, LONDON, LUSAKA, MAPUTO, PRETORIA,
USUN, CAPETOWN

7. OUR FAILURE TO MOVE ON OR EVEN TO TALK AS MUCH ABOUT NAMIBIA AS RHODESIA COULD SOON BECOME A CAUSE OF SUSPICION AMONG AFRICAN NATIONALISTS. ON THE OTHER HAND, PROGRESS ON NAMIBIA WOULD BE LIKELY TO HAVE A CONSTRUCTIVE EFFECT ON SMITH. IF WE WANT FURTHER CLARIFICATION BEFORE WE TRY TO CATALYZE A CONFERENCE ON NAMIBIA, PERHAPS WE SHOULD GET THE NEW UN COMMISSIONER FOR NAMIBIA STARTED ON TRYING TO FIT THE PIECES TOGETHER. AHTISAARI CERTAINLY SEEMED A MODERATE, SKILLED, AND DISCREET MAN WHEN HE WAS FINNISH AMBASSADOR HERE. HE HAS INDICATED A DESIRE TO BE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH US (DAR ES SALAAM 317 AND 76 DAR ES SALAAM 3702). WHY NOT TRY HIM OUT?

8. SOUTH AFRCCA: THIS IS A MUCH MORE COMPLEX SUBJECT AND ONE ON WHICH WE ARE EVEN LESS WELL QUALIFIED TO COMMENT FROM HERE. HOWEVER, WE DO THINK WE SHOULD BE ON OUR GUARD AGAINST SEEING SOUTH AFRICA TOO EXCLUSIVELY AS A FACTOR IN THE RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA SITUATIONS. CERTAINLY ITS SHORT TERM INFLUENCE ON THE RHODESIAN PROBLEM CAN BE CONSIDERABLE. AND IT IS THE DECISIVE ELEMENT IN THE NAMIBIAN PROBLEM AS IT NOW STANDS. HOWEVER, IN TERMS OF LONGER RUN HUMAN, POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND INTERNATIONAL DISRUPTION, SOUTH AFRICA ITSELF LOOMS MUCH LARGER THAN THE OTHER TWO. SOUTH AFRICA IS THE ONLY PLACE IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
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WHERE, EVEN ACCORDING TO NYERERE, GRADUAL CHANGE IS STILL POSSIBLE. SUCH CHANGE IN SOUTH AFRICA WOULD INEVITABLY MEAN CHANGE IN ITS POSITION ON RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA.

9. HERE THEN WE MIGHT BEGIN TO DEFINE FOR OURSELVES JUST WHAT CHANGES WE THINK ARE NECESSARY IN SOUTH AFRICA AND CONCENTRATE ON SOUTH AFRICA QUASOUTH AFRICA WITH A MIXTURE OF PRESSURE AND PROMISE, AIMING AT IMPROVEMENT IN ITS INTERNAL AS WELL AS EXTERNAL POLICIES. CERTAINLY, THE LAST YEAR HAS PROVEN THAT THE AFRICAN NATIONALISTS HAVE NO OBJECTION TO OUR DEALING DIRECTLY WITH SOUTH AFRICA AS LONG AS THEY BELIEVE WE ARE TRULY SEEKING CHANGE. SINCE SOUTH AFRICA'S PRESENT WAY OF LIFE IS AS MUCH AT VARIANCE WITH OUR OWN PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES AS IS CONTINUED DENIAL OF INDEPENDENCE AND SELF-RULE TO THE BLACKS OF RHODESIA AND NAMIBIA, WE HAVE LITTLE CHOICE ANYWAY BUT TO DO WHAT WE CAN TO ENCOURAGE CHANGE.
SPAIN

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, PARAMILITARY FORCES, INDEPENDENCE, INTERIM GOVERNMENT, NEGOTIATIONS, NATIONALISTS, CAT-B
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 15-Feb-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977DARES00701
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: P840076-0052, N770001-0543
Format: TEL
From: DAR ES SALAAM
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770242/aaaabkqi.tel
Line Count: 191
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 7e46cec6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: 77 LONDON 1792, 77 MAPUTO 118
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09-Feb-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3322824
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SOME CONSIDERATIONS ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS
TAGS: PFOR, PDEV, US, RH, WA, SF
To: STATE SS
Type: TE
vdkgvkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/7e46cec6-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009